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Death Star Drones:
How Missile Defense Drone Technology Marks
the Advent of Contingent Sovereignty
Ben Forsgren*
Are advances in national security worth pursuing at the
expense of sovereign equality? A new U.S. drone program may
soon force the world to decide. Thanks to recent technological
advances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and directed-energy
weapons, the United States will soon have a fleet of missile-defense
UAVs outfitted with advanced laser weapons designed to destroy
intercontinental ballistic missiles before the missiles complete
their launch phase. While these drones would significantly
decrease the threat of a nuclear attack against the United States,
they can only function if they are preemptively stationed in the
sovereign airspace of other countries—a clear violation of current
international sovereignty law. This article explains the technology
of the new program, demonstrates how it violates international
sovereignty law, and argues that its implementation will move the
world closer to an international system of contingent sovereignty
that rejects the idea of sovereign equality and subjects weaker
states to the objectives of strong states.

* J. Reuben Clark Law School, J.D. Candidate 2021. Brigham Young University, B.A.
2018. This note is dedicated to my wife Kimberlee, whose selfless sacrifices and invaluable
assistance have made my legal career possible. I would like to thank Professor Eric Talbot
Jensen for overseeing this project and offering years of attentive mentorship and kindness.
I am also grateful to the BYU Law Review editors for their careful, thorough, and helpful edits.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1977, the world watched for the first time as the sinister
Death Star shot a crackling green laser into the heart of Alderaan,
obliterating the planet forever.1 This terrifying, awesome display of
power forever changed pop culture and, perhaps, inadvertently
planted the first seeds of the modern directed-energy missile
defense program.
Although admittedly less cinematic, the basic concept of the
Death Star’s hovering laser attack on Alderaan has long been
considered the “holy grail” of missile defense systems.2 Since
President Ronald Reagan’s appropriately named “Star Wars”
missile defense program, the United States has sought to create a
defense system in which a hovering vehicle instantly identifies,
targets, and destroys incoming missiles.3 Now, thanks to
developments in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone)
technology and directed-energy technology, the dreams of Star
Wars are becoming a reality in the nascent UAV directed-energy

1. STAR WARS: EPISODE IV–A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977).
2. Alexander Begej, Beam Us Up Donnie: The Future of Boost Phase Missile Defense, GEO.
SEC. STUD. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/
2019/08/19/beam-us-up-donnie-the-future-of-boost-phase-missile-defense/.
3. Tim Weiner, Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 1993), https://nyti.ms/298SAcl.
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missile defense program (hereinafter UAV DMDP).4 However, like
many of science fiction’s ideas, this program does not function
quite the same in the real world.
The problem with UAV DMDP is that it requires military
drones to be preemptively stationed above enemy launch sites in
order to defend the United States against potential missile
launches.5 Preemptive self-defense of this nature is prohibited by
the UN Charter, which only allows states to use self-defense to
repel “armed attacks.”6 If states could defend against threats that
were merely perceived, then “defending” states could disregard
the sovereignty of other states and use military force whenever they
felt unsettled rather than when they were attacked.7 A regime such
as this functionally violates the UN Charter’s provisions on
sovereign equality and self-defense by allowing strong states to
disregard the sovereign rights of weaker states if they feel
threatened or uncomfortable―a theoretical paradigm known as
contingent sovereignty.8
Because UAV DMDP undeniably has a preemptive self-defense
element, the United States most likely intends to use it,9 and
international law is greatly influenced by the practices of powerful
actors like the United States,10 the adoption of UAV
DMDP potentially marks the beginning of a new era of
contingent sovereignty.
This Note makes the following argument: UAV DMDP
constitutes preemptive self-defense; preemptive self-defense is an
indication of contingent sovereignty; thus, UAV DMDP is an
4. UAV DMDP is my terminology, and it refers to the overall concept rather than a
single military initiative. Because the program is still developing and entails several projects,
it does not yet have one all-inclusive name. Sometimes the concept is referred to as a drone
Low-power Laser Demonstrator project (LPLD), but since that type of laser is not necessarily
the one that will be used, the name continues to be in flux.
5. See Allison Barrie, New Laser-Equipped Drones Will Take out Missile Threats Against
the US, FOX NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/new-laser-equippeddrones-will-take-out-missile-threats-against-the-us.
6. U.N. Charter art. 51.
7. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51 (requiring all states to “refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state,” unless an “armed attack occurs”).
8. See Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent
World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 293, 305 (2011); infra Section I.C.
9. See infra Conclusion.
10. See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text.
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indication of contingent sovereignty. By extension, this Note also
argues that UAV DMDP and other emerging practices are pushing
the world toward a new era of contingent sovereignty. Part I will
explain the UAV DMDP technology, discuss international
sovereignty, and introduce the concept of contingent sovereignty.
Part II will explain the doctrine and development of self-defense
and show how UAV DMDP constitutes unjustifiable preemptive
self-defense.11 The Note will conclude by discussing the
implications of UAV DMDP.
Because this is a legal Note, discussions of the likely efficacy of
the program, political checks mitigating the program’s
implementation, and possible roles of the UN Security Council in
approving or opposing this program will be left to future
scholarship. This Note only seeks to establish the legal problems
UAV DMDP faces, demonstrate that it cannot be justified under
self-defense, and explain how, if it is used, it will constitute a
marked step on the path to contingent sovereignty.
I. UAV DMDP AND SOVEREIGNTY
A. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Directed-Energy Missile
Defense Program
At any given time, the United States faces serious threats from
nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). UAV DMDP
exists to combat those threats. Currently, eight other states apart
from the United States have nuclear ICBM capabilities, and half of
them are hostile toward the United States in some way.12 ICBMs are
11. Although self-defense is not the only potential legal justification for UAV DMDP,
it is the strongest. See infra Part II.
12. See Nuclear Weapons Worldwide, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/worldwide (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). The
world’s nuclear powers include the United States, Russia, France, China, the United
Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea. Of these countries, Russia, China,
Pakistan, and North Korea present security concerns, if not outright threats, to the United
States. See, e.g., Jill Dougherty, Sound the Alarm on Deadly US-Russia Nuclear Threat, CNN
(Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/12/opinions/new-start-treatydougherty/index.html; Michael Mazza & Henry Sokolski, China’s Nuclear Arms Are a Riddle
Wrapped
in
a
Mystery,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Mar.
13,
2020,
3:43
PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/13/china-nuclear-arms-race-mystery/; North Korea
Threatens US and S Korea with Nuclear Strikes, BBC (Mar. 7, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35741936; Joshua T. White, The Other Nuclear
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often kept on hair-trigger alert, meaning they could be launched at
the United States within seconds or minutes.13 Once launched,
ICBMs cannot be recalled for any reason, they travel at 15,000 mph
(nearly 20 times the speed of sound),14 and can accurately strike a
target from more than 6,000 miles away within about 30 minutes.15
Additionally, ICBMs have an almost incomprehensible
destructive power and are specifically designed to frustrate defense
efforts. First, modern ICBMs are outfitted with multiple nuclear
warheads that combine to create the most powerful weapons on
earth.16 When the first atomic weapons were dropped on Japan,
they each leveled a major city and wrought generational suffering.
Little Boy, dropped on Hiroshima, killed between 90,000 and
146,000 people, and Fat Man, dropped on Nagasaki, killed between
39,000 and 80,000 people.17 Today, atomic weapons are 3,000 times
more powerful than Little Boy or Fat Man.18 In fact, one modern
Russian ICBM has the capacity to wipe out all of France or Texas in
a single blow or, with five or six strikes, destroy the entire U.S.
East Coast.19
Second, defense efforts must strike ICBMs at the right time to
be effective. An ICBM has three stages to its flight path: boost
Threat: America Can’t Escape Its Role in the Conflict Between India and Pakistan, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/americas-role-indiapakistan-nuclear-flashpoint/584113/.
13. Frequently Asked Questions About Taking Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger Alert,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/
default/files/attach/2015/01/Hair-Trigger%20FAQ.pdf.
14. Different ICBMs may travel at different speeds and differ in their flight
capabilities, but the most advanced missiles can travel at this velocity. See Jonathan Marcus,
Russia Deploys Avangard Hypersonic Missile System, BBC NEWS (Dec. 27, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50927648?ns_source=facebook&ns_
campaign=bbcnews&ocid=socialflow_facebook&ns_mchannel=social&fbclid=IwAR13Zu3
FDTrYZXZcdj5KES_Siaq-uhQS2r0EtiaODac-A_CxvvPHJTajHGY.
15. Dave Mosher, What Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Are, How They Work, and Why
the Entire World Fears Them, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2017, 11:47 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-science-2017-7.
16. Barrie, supra note 5.
17. Tom Gillespie, Hell on Earth: What Are Russia’s Satan 2 Nuclear Missiles and Could
the RS-28 Sarmat Warheads Reach the UK?, THE SUN (Oct. 25, 2017, 12:10 PM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2066898/russias-satan-2-nuclear-missiles-rs-28-sarmatwarheads-uk/.
18. Jay Bennett, Here’s How Much Deadlier Today’s Nukes Are Compared to WWII
A-Bombs, POPULAR MECHS. (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
military/a23306/nuclear-bombs-powerful-today/.
19. Gillespie, supra note 17.
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phase, midcourse, and terminal.20 Of these three stages, only the
boost phase presents a realistic opportunity to destroy the missile
entirely because that is the only phase when the missile is moving
as a slow, compact target that can be easily tracked and hit. Once
the missile reaches the midcourse phase, countermeasures are
deployed and the ICBM’s several warheads separate from the
missile.21 Then, during the terminal phase, each individual
warhead becomes a moving target and advances very quickly
along a unique trajectory.22 Furthermore, in a realistic nuclear strike
situation, multiple ICBMs would be launched with dozens of
warheads.23 Therefore, the importance of striking these missiles
while they are compact and vulnerable is critical to successful
missile defense programs.
The challenge with missile defense programs is that eliminating
an ICBM in boost phase is exceedingly difficult. Boost phase only
lasts between one and five minutes, meaning that any defense
system would have to be very close to the launchpad or fast enough
to intercept the ICBM before it reaches its midcourse stage and its
warheads separate.24 Due to the herculean engineering tasks
required to construct a defense system capable of destroying an
ICBM in the first five minutes of flight, boost phase missile defense
of this sort was unachievable for decades. Now, however, the first
legitimate means to strike ICBMs in boost phase are emerging
thanks to years of dedicated work across two disciplines: drones
and directed-energy weapons.
For the purposes of this Note, a drone is an aerial, unmanned
combat machine controlled by a sovereign state. The United States
has been developing drones for decades. While its early models
were medium-altitude vehicles used primarily for surveillance,25
modern drones are designated as “hunter-killer[s]” for their
20. Ballistic Missile Defense Challenge, MISSILE DEF. AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2004),
https://media.nti.org/pdfs/10_5.pdf.
21. Some ICBMs can carry up to ten warheads that can each hit different targets.
Mosher, supra note 15.
22. MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, supra note 20.
23. Barrie, supra note 5.
24. A System of Elements, MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, https://www.mda.mil/
system/elements.html (last updated June 16, 2020).
25. See History of Drone Warfare, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/explainers/history-of-drone-warfare (last visited
Jan. 14, 2021).
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high-altitude, long endurance capabilities that, coupled with an
increased ability to carry heavy weaponry at maximum speeds,
make for intimidating war machines capable of devastating strikes
against American enemies.26
UAV DMDP seeks to capitalize on these recent altitudinal,
endurance, weight-bearing, and speed developments to create a
new class of specialized missile defense drones. For UAV DMDP to
work as well as the government intends, the drones must be able to
fly 63,000 feet high, stay armed and ready in the strike zones for
more than thirty-six hours without landing or refueling, have a
cruising speed of Mach .46 (approximately 350 mph), have a travel
range of 1,900 miles to a target, and be able to support laser
weaponry weighing as much as 12,500 pounds.27 Despite this tall
technological order, these futuristic drones are projected to be
operational between the years 2021 and 2023.28
The directed-energy weapons are long-range weapons which
damage their targets through highly focused energy forms,
including laser, microwave, and particle beams.29 So far, the Army,
Navy, and Air Force have begun developing and testing directed
energy weapons to shoot and destroy small boats, aircraft, or
missiles.30 Although the generators for these laser systems are often
heavy and require a great deal of power, they offer significant
advantages over traditional projectile weapons by offering
virtually endless rounds of ammunition at much lower cost per
shot.31 Given the speedy development and clear advantages of the
directed-energy programs, Robert Afzal―a senior fellow for laser
26. Carey Dunne, Just How Powerful Is the Reaper Drone?, FAST CO. (July 10, 2014),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3032885/just-how-powerful-is-the-reaper-drone.
27. Barrie, supra note 5.
28. Id; see also Tyler Rogoway, Missile Defense Agency Seeking a High-Flying Drone for
“Airborne Laser 2.0”, THE DRIVE (June 14, 2017), https://www.thedrive.com/the-warzone/11526/missile-defense-agency-looking-for-high-flying-drone-for-airborne-laser-2-0.
29. DOUG BEASON, THE E-BOMB 9 (2005).
30. Talal Husseini, HEL on High Water: The Top Navy Laser Weapon Systems,
NAVAL TECH. (Jan. 30, 2020, 12:24 PM), https://www.naval-technology.com/features/navylaser-weapon-systems/; Kyle Mizokami, The U.S. Army Plans to Field the Most Powerful Laser
Weapon Yet, POPULAR MECHS. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
military/weapons/a28636854/powerful-laser-weapon/; Andrew Liptak, The US Air Force
Successfully Tested a Laser System to Shoot Down Missiles, THE VERGE (May 5, 2019, 10:38 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/5/18530089/us-air-force-research-laboratory-shieldlaser-weapons-system-test.
31. Mizokami, supra note 30.
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and sensor systems at Lockheed Martin―has concluded that
“[w]e’re really at the dawn of an era of the utility of laser
weapons.”32 These laser weapons, coupled with the revolutionary
flight and monitoring abilities of modern drones, present the first
real opportunity for a boost phase missile defense system with
UAV DMDP.
UAV DMDP’s concept is simple: “Rather than play defense, . . .
drones could pre-emptively patrol enemy skies [for ICBM
threats].”33 The drones, equipped with high altitude and long
endurance capabilities and laser technology, would hover over
another state’s ICBM launchpads at a height exceeding 60,000 feet
for as long as thirty-six hours at a time.34 If at any time an ICBM
were launched from the territory beneath the drone, it would use
its directed-energy weapon system to fire a powerful, light-speed
laser at an ascending missile and destroy it during boost phase.35
Such technology would provide a sense of national security and
peace of mind that the United States has not felt since before the
Cold War; however, achieving such security comes at the cost of
violating the sovereignty of other countries.36
Because UAV DMDP exists primarily for boost phase missile
defense,37 an anti-missile defense system must reach an ICBM
during the first five minutes of its launch.38 Even rocketing at their
Mach .46 pace, the drones can only travel at five miles per
minute―meaning that at a maximum, they could only be
twenty-five miles away from the ICBM launch pad to possibly be
able to target, fire, and destroy an ICBM within five minutes.
32. Philip Perry, The US Military Will Usher in a Widespread Use of Laser Weapons in the
2020s, BIG THINK (Mar. 21, 2017), https://bigthink.com/philip-perry/the-us-military-plansto-usher-in-widespread-use-of-laser-weapons-by-the-2020s.
33. Barrie, supra note 5.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Of course, this conclusion assumes the best possible version of UAV DMDP in
which the state firing an ICBM could not simply shoot down the American drone before
launching its missiles. Although this Note only analyzes the legal issues associated with
UAV DMDP and does not analyze its potential for success, it bears mentioning that it will
likely not be easy to successfully shoot down the drones involved in the UAV DMDP
program due to their advanced speed, altitude, and weapon capabilities. Additionally, the
near-hegemonic influence of the United States would also likely serve as a political deterrent
to shooting down the drones.
37. Barrie, supra note 5.
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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The practical reality of traversing vast, near-continental territories
like Russia or China to reach a missile within five minutes renders
this scenario impossible. Even smaller nuclear powers like North
Korea would still prove to be too large for the drones to reach the
missiles in time. Accordingly, UAV DMDP can only function if it
operates in another country’s airspace prior to an ICBM launch. This
is an undeniably preemptive self-defense tactic, and it conflicts
with international sovereignty law.
B. International Law Concerning the Sovereignty of Airspace
International law is created primarily through treaties and
custom. Although the international legal regime is fundamentally
permissive rather than prohibitive,39 state actions that violate
preexisting treaty agreements or customs are illegal under
international law.
One archetypal principle in international law, enshrined
expressly both in treaties and in custom, is the idea of state
sovereignty. Indeed, the first guiding principle of the UN Charter
unequivocally states that the United Nations “is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”40 By way of
definition, sovereignty refers to “the whole body of rights and
attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of
all other States, and also in its relation with other States.”41 In other
words, sovereignty is the right of every country to maintain
complete and exclusive control of its territory and all its
domestic affairs.42
In 1919, the Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation established that a state’s sovereignty included
“complete and exclusive” control of the airspace above

39. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
(“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore
be presumed.”).
40. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.
41. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion of
Judge Alvarez).
42. See Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 1 J. AIR L. 94, 94 (1930).
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its territory.43 This idea was sustained and expanded by the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation which created the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and established
the modern system for regulating civil airspace actions in the
international community.44
Later, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea45 further clarified the parameters of sovereignty by declaring
that states’ sovereignty extended to the airspace over their
territorial sea as well as their land territory.46 This treaty therefore
provided all the information needed for the horizontal limits
on a state’s airspace sovereignty, but it did not clarify a vertical
limit.47 To date, no other international agreement has done so
either, leaving the vertical limit of a state’s airspace
sovereignty unsettled.48
Although the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)49 established that outer space is
not subject to state sovereignty like airspace is, it did not specify
where outer space begins and airspace ends—making it difficult to
establish the exact parameters of vertical sovereign airspace.50 Some
authorities, like the International Federation of Astronautics, have
argued that the “Karman Line” that exists at 100 km is the

43. Id.
44. Convention on International Civil Aviation - Doc 7300, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG.,
https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2021)
(defining that the purpose of the ICAO to regulate civil airspace).
45. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
46. Id. at 400 (“This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well
as to its bed and subsoil.”).
47. See generally Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L.
& COM. 65 (2007) (explaining that despite numerous international treaties and scholarly
suggestions, the vertical limit of state sovereignty remains unsettled).
48. Id. at 66 (“Because there is no agreed delineation between a state’s territory and
free outer space, the vertical limit of state sovereignty is unsettled and each state is left to
define the limits of its vertical sovereignty. However, no state has explicitly done this.”).
49. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N.: OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
50. See Reinhardt, supra note 47, at 119–20 (“For instance, the Outer Space Treaty does
not define space.”).
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beginning of outer space.51 Conversely, another suggestion
proposes that airspace sovereignty should have a twelve nautical
mile limit (just over 22 km).52 Regardless of these opinions and
recommendations, there is no international consensus on where
sovereignty-free outer space begins.
Notwithstanding the confusion over sovereignty’s vertical
limit, the legal analysis for UAV DMDP operations need not be
especially concerned with a precise vertical sovereignty limit
because the drones will only fly at around 63,000 feet (just over
eighteen kilometers or just under ten nautical miles), well beneath
where anyone would put the end of airspace sovereignty.53
Therefore, by all accounts, UAV DMDP will necessarily operate in
sovereign airspace wherever it is employed.
Collectively, these treaties stand for the legal realities that
virtually all flyable airspace over sovereign territory belongs to the
state that owns the territory, and that no country may legally enter
the airspace of another country without permission. When state
actors enter the territory of another sovereign state, the breached
state’s rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter are
activated. Although there can be some confusion in marginal cases
over whether minor incursions fall within the UN Charter’s
provisions on the use of force, there is considerable scholarly
consensus that “even if it is sometimes difficult to envisage them as
‘attacks’ in the literal sense—the parameters established in
customary practice governing forcible responses to such incursions

51. 100KM Altitude Boundary for Astronautics, FÉDÉRATION AÉRONAUTIQUE
INTERNATIONALE, https://www.fai.org/page/icare-boundary (last updated June 21, 2004).
52. Reinhardt, supra note 47, at 126–27.
53. Rogoway, supra note 28 (The Missile Defense Agency is seeking HALE UAV with
“On-station altitude of greater than 63,000 ft.”). Although the language “greater than 63,000
ft” only sets an altitudinal floor and technically does not apply a vertical limit, it is well
understood that it is looking for drones that are capable of reaching that height. High altitude
drones today fly at a maximum of 60,000–65,000 feet. See Arthur Holland Michel, High
Altitude Drones, THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD COLLEGE (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/high-altitude-drones/ (“A high-altitude long-endurance
drone is an unmanned aircraft that flies at altitudes higher than about 60,000 ft. and can
remain airborne for extremely lengthy periods of time. The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global
Hawk . . . which flies at altitudes of up to 65,000 ft. . . . is currently the highest-flying and
longest-endurance unmanned aircraft to see extensive use.”).
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are essentially the same as [armed attacks].”54 Indeed, regarding
aerial incursions specifically, history has shown countries exercise
lethal force regularly to defend their skies.55
For example, in July of 1955, an El Al Israel Airlines flight
traveling from Austria to Turkey was shot down for trespassing in
Bulgarian airspace, killing fifty-eight people on board.56 Similarly,
in September of 1983, Soviet fighter jets destroyed a South Korean
jetliner over the Sea of Japan after it strayed off course into Soviet
Union airspace, killing all 269 passengers aboard.57 Still more
examples include Israel downing a Libyan jetliner in 1973 and
killing 108 people after it wandered fifty miles into Israeli
airspace,58 Yugoslavia shooting down two American planes for
being in Yugoslav airspace in 1946,59 and the famous U-2 spy plane
incident in 1960 in which the Soviet Union shot down American
pilot Gary Powers for flying over Soviet airspace.60
These incidents and others,61 coupled with the foregoing treaty
agreements, show that sovereign states legally need not and
practically will not tolerate unsanctioned intrusions into their
airspace.62 Such actions are consistent with a sovereign state’s right
to defend its complete and exclusive control of its airspace.
54. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 186 (2010); see
also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (5th ed. 2012); Albrecht
Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 123
(Bruno Simma et al., 2d ed. 2002) (arguing that even incursions not meant to take territory or
do lasting harm constitute a UN Charter 2(4) violation).
55. See generally Farooq Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight
007 by the Soviet Union, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 555 (1984) (providing several notable examples of
states using lethal force against aerial incursions).
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. at 555.
58. Id. at 569.
59. Id. at 570.
60. Id. at 582. When Powers was shot down, he was flying at over 70,000 feet, showing
that states consider even high altitudes to be part of their sovereign airspace. Jason Caffrey,
Gary Powers: The U-2 Spy Pilot the US Did Not Love, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35064221.
61. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 54, at 187.
62. Of course, like all international incidents, these events gave rise to diplomatic
discord and claims of illegal behavior. For an in-depth analysis of these kinds of
disagreements, see Hassan, supra note 55. Notwithstanding the confusion and allegations of
illegal behavior surrounding these incidents, however, the legal bases for defending
territorial integrity granted in the UN Charter along with the consistent use of lethal selfdefense by states against unwelcome aircraft creates a pattern (if not a norm) that allows
states to use lethal force to maintain control of their aerial territory.
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However, an emerging theory of contingent sovereignty now
contests this right.
C. The Theory of Contingent Sovereignty
Contingent sovereignty is the theory that “sovereign rights and
immunities are not absolute. They depend on the observance of
fundamental state obligations.”63 In other words, “statehood itself
is legally dependent on acceptable government behavior.”64 While
the idea of “acceptable government behavior” is not new,65 the
theory of contingent sovereignty takes it much further by positing
that the consequences for violating state obligations may actually
include a loss of sovereignty itself.66 Accordingly, if a state ceases
to act responsibly, then “protections of sovereignty vanish from
within,” severing the state’s right to non-intervention or invasion
by another state.67 Therefore, it logically follows that two of the
most important questions about contingent sovereignty are:
(1) what kind of state responsibility violations will lead to a loss of
sovereignty, and (2) who may determine that a state no longer
deserves its full sovereignty rights?
First, there are no predetermined actions that automatically
render a state’s sovereignty rights contingent;68 however,
contingent sovereignty intervention is most commonly discussed
in terms of humanitarian intervention or high security concerns like

63. Stewart Patrick, Sec’y of State Pol’y Plan. Staff, Remarks to the 43rd Annual
International Affairs Symposium, The Role of the U.S. Government in Humanitarian
Intervention (Apr. 5, 2004), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm.
64. Hurd, supra note 8, at 305. The scholar Stuart Elden first coined the term
“contingent sovereignty” while discussing the loss of sovereignty norms for countries that
sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty,
Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. OF INT’L AFFS. 11, 14 (2006).
65. States have always had obligations, and obligations necessarily carry
consequences. In fact, since the Peace of Westphalia first legitimized the international system
of states in 1648, states have had to balance their endowment of power and authority with
responsibility. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. 275,
280 (2014). This tradition was decidedly sustained by the International Court of Justice in
1949 when it asserted in the Corfu Channel Case that “[s]overeignty confers rights upon
States and imposes obligations on them.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J.
4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion of Judge Alvarez).
66. See Hurd, supra note 8, at 306.
67. Id.
68. Indeed, it is a paradigm in conflict with the current international legal system.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51.
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terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).69 Because this
Note focuses on the United States defending itself from missile
threats, only the security concerns will be addressed.
Second, contingent sovereignty only exists when a state or
states operate in a different, nonconsenting state without UN
approval. If a state gives consent for intervention, there cannot be a
sovereignty violation because consent itself “is a manifestation of
the ‘sovereign equality’ of states,” and the fact that “a state can
consent to acts otherwise contrary to its sovereignty is recognisable
broadly within international law.”70 Furthermore, any action
approved by the UN does not render sovereignty contingent
because nearly every state in the world has already consented to
the terms of the UN Charter, which has provisions allowing it to
violate state sovereignty by “tak[ing] at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.”71 Furthermore, those few states that have not
consented are still bound to the terms of the Charter through
customary international law.72 In other words, a state’s sovereignty
69. For examples of humanitarian treatment of contingent sovereignty, see Keith A.
Petty, Humanity and National Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity Response Operations, 34 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 745 (2013); Hurd, supra note 8, at 21; Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the
People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97 (2013). While much of the discussion around securitybased contingent sovereignty focuses on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the
questions of contingent sovereignty could logically extend to cover other security interests,
like the emerging threats of cyber security. See generally Jensen, supra note 65.
70. Max Byrne, Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘Intervention by Invitation’
as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, 3 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 97,
99–100 (2016).
71. U.N. Charter art. 51.
72. See Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-state Actors Under
International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN
AFFS. 331, 339–40 (“The use of force regime outlined [in the UN Charter] is recognized as
customary international law, meaning that it is binding upon all states, even those few states
that do not belong to the UN. Although it is still debated whether the Charter intended to
codify customary international law as of the Charter’s inception, it is undisputed that all
states are bound by the document’s norms.”). Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law states “[i]t is generally accepted that the principles of the United
Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force have the character of jus cogens,” which means
“the international community of states” recognizes these principles “as peremptory,
permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate international agreements
and other rules of international law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject
to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. K (internal citations omitted);
see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 94, 96–97 (June 27)
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cannot be violated by an invited state’s interference or by UN
interference because the sovereign state has consented to such
action in either case.
The inquiry into contingent sovereignty in this Note looks
to UAV DMDP because it is a program that has neither
been consented to by any other state nor approved by the
UN Security Council. Therefore, if the United States proceeds
with UAV DMDP, it will functionally decide that its security
interests of nuclear defense outweigh the sovereignty rights of
states capable of launching nuclear attacks—a clear example of
contingent sovereignty.
D. International Acceptance of Contingent Sovereignty
UAV DMDP would arguably be the first US program to adhere
to a theory of contingent sovereignty, but the idea of pursuing
policies resembling contingent sovereignty has existed among
prominent experts for some time. For example, according to
Richard N. Haass―who is the current President of the Council on
Foreign Relations, previous Director of Policy Planning in Colin
Powell’s State Department, and previous member of the Carter,
Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations―sovereignty
rights come with obligations that specifically prohibit states from
supporting terrorism or pursuing WMDs.73 In Haass’s words from
2002, “sovereignty does not grant governments a blank check to do
whatever they like within their own borders.”74
Additionally, Philip Zelikow, who served as the executive
director of the 9/11 Commission and wrote the 2002 United States
National Security Strategy, published a 1998 report describing a
world order that seems to adopt the theory of contingent
sovereignty.75 In Zelikow’s words:
International norms should adapt so that . . . states are obliged to
reassure those who are worried and to take reasonable measures
to prove they are not secretly developing weapons of mass
(Merits) (applying customary international law instead of multilateral treaties like the U.N.
Charter).
73. Elden, supra note 64, at 15.
74. Id. (quoting Richard N. Haass, Dir. of the Off. of Pol’y Plan. Staff US Dep’t of State,
The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association: Defining U.S. Foreign
Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World (April 22, 2002)).
75. Id. at 14–15.
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destruction. Failure to supply such proof, or prosecute the
criminals living in their borders, should entitle worried nations to
take all necessary actions for their self-defense.76

These statements from Haass and Zelikow jointly propose a
foreign policy that looks something like the following: if a state is
worried about another state’s terroristic or WMD activity, it may
take “all necessary actions” for its self-defense, regardless of
sovereignty considerations. Such an approach resembles the
preemptive self-defense prohibited by the UN Charter―showing
how preemptive self-defense may in fact be considered a
manifestation of contingent sovereignty.77
Despite the implicit support for contingent sovereignty that
may exist in statements like those from Haass and Zelikow,
contingent sovereignty is hardly an accepted doctrine in the
international community. In a 2002 speech by former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan regarding intervention in Iraq, Annan
reaffirmed that “[a]ny State, if attacked, retains the inherent right
of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. But beyond that,
when States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to
international peace and security, there is no substitute for the
unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.”78
While much has changed since 2002, the prevailing view still
favors Secretary-General Annan’s view over Philip Zelikow’s
opinion. In 2016, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke about the
UN’s growing focus on preventing genocide and crimes against
humanity, and stated that although such efforts by the UN may feel
as though they undermine state sovereignty, the United Nations’
engagement with member states will be “based on cooperation,
transparency[,] and respect for sovereignty,” and that the UN
“seeks to reinforce sovereignty, not challenge or undermine it.”79
76. Id. (quoting ASHTON B. CARTER, JOHN M. DEUTCH & PHILIP D. ZELIKOW,
CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL POLICY (1998)).
77. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51.
78. Press Release, United Nations, When Force is Considered, There is No Substitute
for Legitimacy Provided by United Nations, Secretary-General Says in General Assembly
Address (Sept. 12, 2002), https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm.
79. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, Remarks at Security Council Open Debate
on Respect for the Principles and Purposes of the Charter as a Key Element for the
Maintenance
of
International
Peace
and
Security
(Feb.
15,
2016),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-02-15/secretary-generalsremarks-security-council-open-debate-respect.
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More recently, in September of 2019, the UN General Assembly
spoke so extensively about sovereignty concerns that a UN press
release summarized the general theme of the arguments as:
“International peace and security are gravely threatened when
national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity—
principles on which the United Nations was founded—are
undermined and violated.”80 From these statements and others, it
would seem that the notion of contingent sovereignty has won few
vocal converts in the international community.
Given the global opposition to the idea of contingent
sovereignty, how can the United States justify UAV DMDP,
which not only infringes upon sovereignty, but completely
ignores it? After all, maintaining an indefinite military presence
in another country’s airspace is an unprecedented suggestion
that breaks rank with even the strongest statements favoring
contingent sovereignty.
The answer is the United States can either persuasively justify
UAV DMDP under the current sovereignty framework or,
alternatively, completely embrace a new theory of contingent
sovereignty. In other words, if UAV DMDP cannot be fully excused
under the current framework, it necessarily constitutes a giant,
perhaps irreversible, step toward a new paradigm of contingent
sovereignty in international law.
II. SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The best argument to justify UAV DMDP is self-defense.
Although self-defense is not the only potential legal justification for
UAV DMDP, it is the strongest. While other justifications such as
consent, armed conflict, countermeasures, and necessity arguments
warrant discussion as well, it is unlikely that any of these
justifications would result in an outcome any different from that of
self-defense. For the sake of brevity and efficiency, this Note will
limit its discussion of justifications for UAV DMDP to self-defense.
Self-defense is an ancient, archetypal right of every state. When
the United Nations Charter was written, it sought to advance a new
world order of peaceful coexistence among equally sovereign
80. Press Release, United Nations, World Leaders Denounce Breaches of Sovereignty
in Collective Efforts to Settle Conflict, Tackle Climate Change, as General Assembly Debate
Continues (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12187.doc.htm.
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nation states―a mission it made clear by listing sovereign equality
as its very first guiding principle in the Charter.81 However, the idea
of sovereign equality had to be reconciled with the “inherent right”
states already had to self-defense.82 The result was Article 51 of the
UN Charter, which sustains the principle of sovereign equality, but
emphasizes that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations.”83 The practical result of
the reconciliation between sovereign equality and self-defense is an
international system in which all states must respect one another’s
sovereignty unless they are acting to repel an armed attack.
This system prompts the questions, what constitutes an armed
attack, and when can self-defense be used to prevent an
armed attack? The answers to these questions are still unsettled. In
broad terms, these questions hinge on whether an attack is
anticipatory or preemptive. For the purposes of this Note,
anticipatory self-defense refers to the type of defense described by
the Caroline standard and covered by Article 51, and preemptive
self-defense is self-defense that responds to threats that are not
imminent according to the Caroline standard.84 Anticipatory selfdefense is lawful defensive force used against an imminent armed
attack whereas preemptive self-defense is unlawful defensive force
used against a non-imminent threat of an armed attack.
The majority of the international community agrees that
anticipatory self-defense is included in the meaning of the text of
Article 51; however, preemptive force is much more likely to fall
outside the meaning of the text and therefore violate the
provision.85 While some states and international lawyers argue that
81. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1.
82. U.N. Charter art. 51.
83. Id.
84. While there are three broadly recognized and debated types of self-defense, the
terms are used by various scholars to refer to differing principles. For this Note, preemptive
self-defense’s often-used other term of “preventive self-defense” will not be used.
Additionally, interceptive self-defense, the third type of self-defense, will not be discussed
in this Note. While interceptive self-defense could add a beneficial perspective to the
discussion, it likely will not affect the overall outcome and the confines of this Note do not
allot for its treatment. For treatment of interceptive self-defense, see DINSTEIN, supra note 54.
85. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 107 (2002) (“States seem willing to accept strong evidence of the
imminence of an overpowering attack as tantamount to the attack itself, allowing a
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preemptive self-defense should be considered legitimate, Professor
Sean Murphy points out that “[t]o date, . . . no authoritative
decision-maker within the international community has taken a
position on whether preemptive self-defense is permissible under
international law, or whether it is permissible but only under
certain conditions.”86
Accordingly, for the United States to justify UAV DMDP as
self-defense, it must convincingly demonstrate that state practice in
the international community has moved the standard for legitimate
self-defense away from anticipatory self-defense and into the realm
of preemptive self-defense. If it cannot, then UAV DMDP breaches
international legal standards and represents a deviant move
toward contingent sovereignty.
In modern history, there are certain events which color the
discussion on imminence and provide insight into the parameters
of internationally legal preemptive self-defense actions. Beginning
with the foundational Caroline affair, this Part tracks the historical
development of “imminence” in the international community,
discusses how it is currently understood, and shows that UAV
DMDP cannot be justified according to that understanding.
A. The Caroline Era of Anticipatory Self-Defense
Conceptual understanding of anticipatory self-defense begins
with the Caroline test.87 The Caroline test is derived from an incident
between the United States and Britain during the Canadian
Rebellion of 1837.88 At that time, a newly formed, pro-Canada
American force began harassing British soldiers along the Niagara
River between Canada and the United States.89 Among these forces
was a steamboat called the Caroline which ferried supplies and
reinforcements across the river to the rebels in Canada.90

demonstrably threatened state to respond under Article 51 as if the attack had already
occurred, or at least to treat such circumstances, when demonstrated, as mitigating the
system’s judgment of the threatened state’s pre-emptive response.”).
86. Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699,
702 (2005).
87. John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 741 (2004).
88. John Dever & James Dever, Cyberwarfare: Attribution, Preemption, and National Self
Defense, 2 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 25, 39–40 (2013).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 41.
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Considering the Caroline’s capacity to strengthen and transport the
rebel forces, the British militia in Canada determined the Caroline
should be destroyed even though it was moored in
American waters.91
The British troops boarded the Caroline, killed two Americans,
set the ship on fire, and sent it over the edge of Niagara Falls.92 In
response to vehement American condemnation of the attack, the
British justified their actions by claiming they acted in self-defense.
In response, Daniel Webster, who was the Secretary of State of the
United States, asserted in an official letter that self-defense against
imminent attacks may only take place when there is “a necessity of
self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.”93
From the time Secretary Webster penned his letter to the
passage of the UN Charter, the Caroline test enjoyed rare popularity
and legitimacy. Hailed as the “seminal definition”94 of permissible
use of anticipatory force and lauded for having a “mythical
status”95 as a definition of imminence, the Caroline test went on to
be adopted by the International Military Tribunal in the
Nuremberg trials and even survived the adoption of the UN
Charter in 1945.96 Truly, the Caroline test is a foundational doctrine
of anticipatory self-defense.
Yet, despite its pioneering role in defining anticipatory selfdefense, the Caroline test is not without controversy. The principal
debate regarding the Caroline test today asks whether it is poorly
tailored to states’ needs in an era of modern warfare, prompting
some to argue that “such a parochial perspective could be

91. Id. at 41–42.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Daniel Webster, Case of the Caroline, 63 NILES’ NAT’L REG., Sept. 24, 1842, at 58.
Webster also discussed the need for proportionality in self-defense attacks, but because this
Note deals with mere neutralizing force used against WMD capable of killing millions,
proportionality is not of great relevance.
94. Dever & Dever, supra note 88, at 47.
95. Id. at 48 (“Indeed, as Professor Christine Gray remarked in 2000, the Caroline test
has attained a mythical status not only for its definition of imminence but also for its
requirement that the use of force be necessary and proportional to a coming attack.”)
(referencing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105
(Oxford 2000)).
96. Yoo, supra note 87, at 741.
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disastrous in a thermonuclear age riven by terrorist acts and rogue
nation states.”97
In response, adherents to the Caroline standard claim that
expanding the meaning of Article 51 to meet these threats
constitutes preemptive self-defense, which “would place the law on
a very slippery slope, taking us back into the pre-Charter world in
which nations resorted to warfare for ‘just’ causes.”98 Before 9/11,
this debate emerged prominently in two notable events: the 1981
Israeli attack on Iraq and the 1986 American attack on Libya.99
On June 7, 1981, Israel conducted an air strike on Iraq and
destroyed the construction site of a French-supplied nuclear
reactor.100 To justify this blatant violation of sovereignty and armed
attack against Iraq, Israel invoked a self-defense argument claiming
it had been concerned for several years that the nuclear program
would produce weapons, and that it only attacked to prevent Iraq
from using nuclear weapons against Israel.101 Although subsequent
evidence gathered by the international community revealed that it
was truly Iraq’s intention to build nuclear weapons, it remained
unclear if Iraq intended to actually use them.102 Additionally, the
same intelligence showed that Iraq lacked the means to create any
such weapons for another twelve to eighteen months.103
Notwithstanding the valid threat that the nuclear facility could
pose to Israel, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 487 which “strongly condemn[ed] the military attack by
Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the
norms of international conduct,” and “[c]all[ed] upon Israel to
refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof.”104

97. Dever & Dever, supra note 88, at 48; see also MICHAEL W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST:
PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 15 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008).
98. Murphy, supra note 86, at 714.
99. While there are other examples which could be included in this discussion―like
the 1967 Six-Day War, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 (May 2004), or Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27)―only the most
relevant examples could be included within the limits of this Note.
100. Donald R. Rothwell, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International Terrorism,
24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 337, 343 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. S.C. Res. 487 (June 19, 1981).
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Israel’s attack on Iraq demonstrates that in 1981 the
international community would not tolerate a strike carried out
twelve to eighteen months in advance of an attack that was not
certain to occur. Although Israel sought to justify its actions
through self-defense, it failed to produce any clear state practice
supporting its interpretation of self-defense and could not rebut the
accusations that it had acted before exhausting other peaceful
means of resolving the problem.105
Five years after Israel’s attack on Iraq, the limits of anticipatory
force were again questioned on the world stage. On April 5, 1986, a
Libyan national carried out a terrorist attack on a popular nightclub
in Berlin that killed two and wounded seventy-nine Americans,
among other victims. Because the terrorist was presumably acting
under the orders of Libya’s head of state, Muammar al-Gaddafi, the
United States responded ten days later by invading Libya’s
sovereign airspace and bombing three targets in Tripoli and two
near Benghazi.106
Unlike a traditional exercise of anticipatory self-defense, the
United States did not claim it was repelling any kind of imminent
attack. Instead, it claimed its defensive force was justified by “clear
evidence that Libya [was] planning future attacks,”107 and because
“preemptive action against his terrorist installations will not only
diminish Colonel [Gaddafi’s] capacity to export terror, it will
provide him with incentives . . . to alter his criminal behavior.”108 In
other words, the United States was asserting that the doctrine of
self-defense legitimized not only uses of force to repel an incoming
attack but also uses of force aimed at preventing indeterminate
future attacks and deterring terrorists as well.
Although this claim by the United States departed markedly
from the Caroline test and resembled Israel’s preemptive action
105. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 173 (Oxford, 4th ed.,
2018).
106. Rothwell, supra note 100, at 344.
107. Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Sec’y, Statement on the United States
Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 14, 1986), in RONALD REAGAN PRES’L LIBR.: PUB. PAPERS PRES.
RONALD REAGAN, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-principaldeputy-press-secretary-speakes-united-states-air-strike-0 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
108. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against
Libya (Apr. 14, 1986), in RONALD REAGAN PRES’L LIBR.: PUB. PAPERS PRES. RONALD REAGAN,
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-air-strikeagainst-libya (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
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decried by the UN in 1981, there was not as much fallout resulting
from the United States’ actions. There was no Security Council
resolution or International Court of Justice case condemning the act
as illegal,109 and thus the United States did not need to actively
defend its anticipatory action by showing state practice.
Consequently, the world was left with mixed precedent: the armed
attack against Iraq twelve to eighteen months prior to their
anticipated use of nuclear weapons was not acceptable, but an
attack launched to deter Libya from unspecified future attacks did
not receive the same level of condemnation.
While the world was still operating under the Caroline test at
this time, it was arguably in Libya that the first seeds of preemptive
self-defense and contingent sovereignty appear, as well as the
evident disparity in self-defense justifications between world
powers like the United States and lesser powers like Israel―themes
that became incredibly important when the world changed forever
on September 11, 2001.
B. 9/11 and Preemptive Self-Defense
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the most important
developments in international self-defense law since the ratification
of the UN Charter. Following the infamous attacks by the Al-Qaeda
network—which destroyed the World Trade Center in New York
City, collapsed the west wing of the Pentagon in Virginia, and
caused the deaths of nearly 3,000 people110—the United States
responded swiftly, causing the world to reevaluate what actions are
included in the self-defense justification under Article 51.
Among the United States’ responses to 9/11 was the 2002
National Security Strategy, which specifically declared the United
States’ view of a more expansive self-defense doctrine under
international law.111 In what has subsequently been coined as the
Bush Doctrine, President George W. Bush’s administration
declared that the United States’ right of self-defense went beyond

109. Rothwell, supra note 100, at 345.
110. Peter L. Bergen, September 11 Attacks, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks.
111. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
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anticipatory self-defense and allowed it to act preemptively against
terrorists stating:
The United States has long maintained the option of
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national
security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.112

Notably, the United States specifically discussed the existing
right to anticipatory self-defense but refuted the Caroline standard
of instant and overwhelming attacks by asserting that legitimate
anticipatory action may be taken “even if uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”113 The National Security
Strategy further undermined the Caroline test by expressly
declaring the new age of rogue states and terrorists left the United
States no option but to reject the limited “reactive posture” of the
past114 and suggesting that “[i]n particular the requirement that a
threat be imminent needs to be revisited.”115 Breaking rank with all
preceding self-defense doctrines in its bald assertion of a right to
112. Id. at 15.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. GRAY, supra note 105, at 249–50. Since then, the United States has indeed updated
its definition of imminence. The United States now uses the following framework for
imminence analysis:
“the nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the
anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the
likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom
in the absence of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other
opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to
cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage. . . . [T]he absence of specific
evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack
does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of
the exercise of the right of self-defense, provided that there is a reasonable and
objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.” Finally, as is now
increasingly recognized by the international community, the traditional
conception of what constitutes an “imminent” attack must be understood in light
of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of
terrorist organizations.
WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED
STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 9 (2016),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5847db914.html (internal citations omitted).
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preemptive force, the Bush Doctrine’s acceptance by the
international community would be immediately tested in the
Iraq War.
On March 19, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq to prevent
its acquisition and use of WMDs against the United States.116
Although it is debated whether this was the true motive, it is
undisputed that there was no imminent threat from Iraq against the
United States as defined by the Caroline test. In fact, the United
States’ own National Intelligence Council reported in 2002 that
“Iraq . . . if left unchecked . . . probably will have a nuclear weapon
during this decade.”117
Given its demonstrable lack of imminence and clear deviance
from earlier questions of anticipatory self-defense in international
law, the Iraq war is arguably the first modern preemptive war—
something that, under the UN Charter, would traditionally be
considered illegal.118 Yet, notwithstanding these problems, the
United States garnered an international coalition of forty-nine
countries supporting the war effort and set an enduring example of
using preemptive self-defense to justify a major and lasting
invasion against another sovereign state.119
Since the U.S. authorized military action in Iraq, other states
likewise have adopted policies which arguably support preemptive
self-defense theories. For example, although Russia was critical of
the Iraq invasion, its quarrel was with the application
of preemptive force and not with the theory of preemptive
116. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR (2003), https://20012009.state.gov/documents/organization/24172.pdf.
117. NAT’L FOREIGN INTEL. BD., IRAQ’S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 5 (2002), https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/iraq/iraq-wmdnie-01-2015.pdf (emphasis added).
118. But see Murphy, supra note 86, at 730–31. (“[T]he United States did not assert that
the invasion of Iraq was permissible under international law because of an evolved right of
preemptive self-defense. Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful
because it was authorized by the Security Council, a theory also maintained by the other
members of the U.S.-led coalition. At most, it seems that some of the U.S. government’s
statements on the legality of the action contained cryptic references suggesting legal
authority other than that emanating from Security Council resolutions, but the terms
‘anticipatory self-defense’ or ‘preemptive self-defense’ are never used. Consequently, it is no
surprise that some international lawyers believe that the invasion of Iraq provides no
precedent for a right of preemptive self-defense, but others assert that it does.”).
119. For an explanation on why a coalition such as this is legally significant, see the
discussion on international law creation through state action and opinio juris, infra
Section II.C.
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force generally.120 In fact, in 2008 the Russian military Chief of Staff
General Yuri Baluyevsky asserted Russia’s dedication to the idea of
preemptive self-defense by declaring, “We have no plans to attack
anyone, but . . . to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including
preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.”121 This
blatant endorsement of preemptive self-defense leaves little
question on Russia’s stance regarding preemptive self-defense.
Similarly, despite initially condemning the invasion of Iraq,122
the Indian government has also adopted preemptive approaches to
self-defense. For example, in 2002 the Indian Finance Minister
Jaswant Singh described India’s stance on preemptive self-defense
while on a trip to Washington, D.C. by stating: “Preemption or
prevention is inherent in deterrence. Where there is deterrence
there is preemption. The same thing is there in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Every nation has that right. . . .
Preemption is the right of any nation to prevent injury to itself.”123
This theme was reiterated the next year by Foreign Minister
Yashwant Sinha who declared, “[T]he international community
must realize that India has a much better case to go for preemptive
action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq.”124 As early as April
of 2004, the Indian government extended these ideas to its military
policy by embracing the “Cold Start” doctrine—a renewed military
policy that embraced a posture of “proactive deterrence” with
“offensive bias.”125
Lastly, it bears mentioning that some scholars have pointed to
the growing state practice of targeted drone strikes as a form of
preemptive warfare.126 While such programs may exercise lethal
120. See Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive
Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm, 15 INT’L STUDS. PERSPS. 163, 175 (2014).
121. Id. at 176 (emphasis added) (quoting Russia Could Use Nuclear Weapons as Preventive
Measure to Thwart Major Threat, Official Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 19, 2008),
https://www.foxnews.com/story/russia-could-use-nuclear-weapons-as-preventivemeasure-to-thwart-major-threat-official-says.amp).
122. Id. at 172.
123. Id. at 173.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 173–74.
126. As Fisk and Ramos point out, the modern drone program is now able to take lethal
action against ambiguous threats like suspected militants with unconfirmed identities who
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preemptive force in non-consenting countries, the justification for
such programs is usually based in the armed conflict doctrine
rather than self-defense. For example, although the United States
uses its well-known “unwilling or unable” doctrine to justify
sending Reaper drones into countries which are unwilling or
unable to eliminate internal terrorist threats,127 it does so under the
auspices of the war on terror―an armed conflict duly sanctioned by
the U.S. Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) in 2001.128 Therefore, these matters are beyond the scope
of preemptive self-defense.
For the foregoing reasons, the Bush Doctrine, the Iraq War,
Russia’s claim to a right of preemptive strikes, and India’s
incorporation of preemptive self-defense into its military policy
seem to indicate an emerging state practice of preemptive selfdefense, or at least a standard much different from the Caroline test.
However, on their own they do not overcome the status quo. For
the United States to justify UAV DMDP under self-defense, it
would have to show that under customary international law, these
state practices are not new exceptions but the accepted norm.
The following section explains why the United States fails in
its arguments that customary international law includes
these practices.

are targeted for suspicious “patterns of life.” In 2013, United States senior officials admitted
that dozens of these strikes had been committed against low-ranking fighters or foot soldiers
who presented no high-level threats, but “would have been future leaders” if they had been
left alive. Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos, Introduction: The Preventive Force Continuum, in
PREVENTIVE FORCE: DRONES, TARGETED KILLING, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 1, 9–10 (Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos eds., 2016).
127. Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2014/695. This letter is largely viewed as a
watershed moment for the “unwilling or unable” doctrine; however, it was not the first
instance of the idea. For example, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams once wrote to the
Spanish government informing it that if it were unable to prevent cross-border incursions
against America from Creeks, Seminoles, and escaped slaves in Spanish Florida, then the
United States would invade and claim Florida for itself. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo,
The “Bush Doctrine”: Can Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 843,
851–52 (2009).
128. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
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C. The Current Law of Self-Defense Cannot Justify UAV DMDP
Considering the development and current state of “imminence”
under international law, the United States will likely fail to justify
UAV DMDP under a theory of anticipatory defense. Because UAV
DMDP must operative preemptively,129 justifying it requires the
United States to show that customary international law has
legitimized preemptive self-defense in accordance with Article 51.
It has not.
Preliminarily, customary international law is generated by the
combination of two elements: state practice and opinio juris. State
practice refers to behaviors of sovereign states that are widespread
and representative, and opinio juris refers to a state’s recognition
that those behaviors were carried out as legal obligations. Despite
state practice’s straightforward definition, it can be exceedingly
difficult to establish. As one author phrased it:
Scholars have debated what kind of activity constitutes state
practice and disagree on the duration and frequency of the
activity that is necessary to satisfy the definition. Further, it seems
practically impossible to ascertain the practices of the nearly 200
states in the international community. Thus, a survey of
customary international law is often highly selective and takes
into account only major powers and the most affected states. But
even in this smaller focus there is no adequate and systematic
method for proving the elements of custom. Consequently,
international law arguments based on custom always suffer from
a considerable degree of arbitrariness. 130

Likewise, while it may seem easier to establish opinio juris in
theory, states tend to be minimalistic and guarded in public
statements on controversial international legal theories which may
contradict their interests later. Accordingly, explicit statements on
a given state’s position on emerging norms of preemptive force will
be few and far between. Given the “considerable degree of
arbitrariness” in the analysis of state practice and the rarity of
definitive opinio juris statements, it is unsurprising that there is not
sufficient support for the United States to argue that preemptive
self-defense has become customary international law.
129. Supra Part I.
130. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State
Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2008).
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First, the world’s overwhelmingly negative response to Israel
preemptively attacking an Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981 clearly shows
that exercising preemptive self-defense against non-imminent
threats of nuclear weapons is opposed by state practice and the
opinio juris of states.131 UAV DMDP is designed to prevent nuclear
weapons from ever becoming threats, not respond to active or
imminent nuclear threats.132 If undisputed intelligence showing
Iraq’s intent to launch a nuclear weapon at Israel was insufficient
to constitute an imminent armed attack because it could not happen
for twelve to eighteen months, how much less imminent is an attack
against the United States that has not been threatened at all?133
Second, although some select state actions and declarations
following 9/11 endorse preemptive self-defense,134 they do not
amount to customary international law. The only event on a big
enough scale which the United States could argue established a
new norm of preemptive self-defense is the Iraq War. However,
due to the divisive and limited nature of that war, it fails to establish
such a custom.
The coalition in support of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 consisted
of forty-nine countries.135 This figure accounted for nearly a fourth
of the members of the United Nations and included influential
states like the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea. As the
United States portrayed the coalition: “The population of Coalition
countries is approximately 1.23 billion people. Coalition countries
have a combined GDP of approximately $22 trillion. Every major
race, religion, ethnicity in the world is represented. The Coalition
includes nations from every continent on the globe.”136
Yet, while the membership of the coalition seems to have
widespread and representative elements, it does not definitively
establish state practice. Notably absent from the coalition are the

44.

131. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text; Rothwell, supra note 100, at 343–

132. See Barrie, supra note 5.
133. See Rothwell, supra note 100, at 343–44.
134. Supra Sections II.B–C (presenting the Bush Doctrine, Russia’s claim to a right of
preemptive strikes, India’s incorporation of preemptive self-defense into its military policy,
and preemptive strikes by Israel and the United States as evidence of countries embracing
preemptive self-defense).
135. Who are the Current Coalition Members?, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 27, 2003),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.html.
136. Id.
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remaining three members of the UN Security Council—namely,
France, China, and Russia.137 These countries, along with almost the
entire Arab League, the African Union, Germany, Canada, Mexico,
Brazil, and several others, opposed the invasion.138 Consequently,
if it can be said that there was widespread and representative
support of the invasion, it can also be said that there was
widespread and representative condemnation of the invasion.
Moreover, even if there were established state practice
supporting the Iraq invasion, that support would not necessarily
indicate state practice in support of preemptive force. In fact,
according to Claus Kreß, “the ‘coalition of the willing’ did not rely
on a claim of a broadened right of anticipatory self-defence in order
to justify the lawfulness of the use of force in Iraq.”139 Additionally,
some members of the coalition have explicitly stated that the rights
of self-defense do not extend to preemptive self-defense.140
Drawing from these examples and others, it certainly seems the
current state of international law does not accept the idea of
preemptive self-defense even with the Iraq War coalition. In fact,
even scholars who advocate for the possibility that the law is
evolving toward such acceptance concede that “there is insufficient
evidence to say with certainty” that the law currently accepts such

137. See id.
138. See Arab States Line Up Behind Iraq, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2003, 04:09 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2882851.stm; Africans Back France on Iraq, CNN
(Feb. 21, 2003, 2:49 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/20/
africa.summit/index.html; France and Allies Rally Against War, BBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2003, 7:24
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2821145.stm; Tim Harper, Canadians Back
Chrétien
on
War,
Poll
Finds,
TORONTO
STAR
(Mar.
22,
2003),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110706184537/http://25461.vws.magma.ca/admin/articl
es/torstar-24-03-2003c.html; Maggie Farley & Richard Boudreaux, Mexico’s Envoy to U.N.
Leaves,
with
Defiance,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
22,
2003,
12:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-nov-22-fg-zinser22-story.html;
Brazil:
Iraq,
U.S.
Guilty
of
‘Disrespect’,
NEWSMAX.COM
(Mar.
20,
2003),
https://archive.ph/20120904171112/http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/
3/19/211836.shtml#selection-419.0-419.41.
139. Claus Kreß, The State Conduct Element, in 1 THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A
COMMENTARY 412, 475 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds., 2017).
140. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICY ON THE USE OF
DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING, 2015–16, HL 141, HC 574, at 45 (UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf
(“[I]nternational law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack
but does not authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive attack against a threat that is
more remote.”).
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a doctrine.141 Consequently, the Iraq War, though fought on a
preemptive theory with a broad international coalition, cannot
reliably establish state practice or opinio juris for preemptive force.
So far, nothing else can, either.
Alternatively, given the uphill battle of arguing that there is a
new international custom for preemptive self-defense, the United
States may instead simply argue that nuclear weapons are
inherently imminent threats, and therefore any action taken against
them are anticipatory, not preemptive, acts of force.
As explained in Part I, nuclear weapons arguably create an
imminent and existential threat to the United States. At any
moment, a nuclear ICBM is less than an hour away from destroying
a landmass the size of Texas, and there is almost nothing that could
stop it once launched.142 By this description, it is difficult to imagine
a scenario that is more appropriately described as “instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”143 Thus, the United States could argue that violating
sovereignty to prevent nuclear attacks has always been consistent
with the Caroline standard, and that such actions have not yet taken
place simply because they were historically impossible. Now that
technology has allowed for boost-phase attacks on nuclear ICBMs,
self-defense permits the United States to employ UAV DMDP to
prevent an imminent and cataclysmic attack.
But are ICBMs really imminent threats? Does a threat warrant
preemptive self-defense if it is always imminent but rarely likely?
Despite the theoretical appeal of the argument that nuclear
weapons present imminent threats, the reality is the world has been
faced with this exact scenario for over sixty years and no attack has
ever taken place. Speculatively speaking, it seems unlikely that the
international community would share the view that a threat which
has been (more or less) effectively managed for the better part of a
century is “instant and overwhelming.” Instead, given that
countries and scholars alike view even the infringement upon
territorial integrity as likely constituting an “armed attack” for the

141. Ashley S. Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
(Marc Weller ed., 2015).
142. Supra notes 12–24 and accompanying text; Mosher, supra note 15; Gillespie,
supra note 17.
143. Webster, supra note 93, at 58.
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 661, 676

877

4.FORSGREN_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2021 1:49 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:3 (2021)

purposes of the UN Charter,144 sending in the weaponized UAV
DMDP to hold constant positions above military targets will almost
certainly be viewed as a preemptive self-defense move in response
to a non-imminent threat. Just as the world condemned Israel’s
attack on Iraq in 1981 because the attack occurred twelve to
eighteen months before a threat could materialize,145 or how
numerous countries condemned the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for
prematurely responding to a potential nuclear threat,146 the United
States would likely be condemned for violating the sovereignty of
other states with the UAV DMDP without an active nuclear threat
by those states.147
For the foregoing reasons, the United States has no persuasive
argument that international custom approves of preemptive attacks
or that UAV DMDP responds to an imminent threat.
CONCLUSION
Because UAV DMDP cannot be justified under any accepted
definition of imminence, it constitutes preemptive self-defense.
And because preemptive self-defense violates international
sovereignty law, UAV DMDP necessarily trades notions of
traditional sovereignty for notions of contingent sovereignty.
Therefore, adoption of UAV DMDP moves the world closer to a
paradigm of contingent sovereignty.
By unilaterally deciding into which countries and under what
circumstances it will send armed aircraft, the United States rejects
the idea that every state has the same sovereign right to control its
airspace. Instead, it purports that American interests supersede the
sovereignty rights of countries that do not live up to America’s
144. RUYS, supra note 54, at 185–86; Randelzhofer, supra note 54, at 123.
145. Rothwell, supra note 99, at 343–44.
146. Supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
147. I certainly do not mean to trivialize the reality of nuclear threats; rather, I only
acknowledge that in light of the historical pattern of condemnation of states who have
responded too quickly to actual, demonstrable nuclear threats, it is unlikely that the United
States would successfully justify self-defense actions against hypothetical nuclear threats.
This acknowledgment still leaves open the possibility that sufficiently high tensions with
reliable intelligence indicating a nuclear strike could justify self-defense to an “armed attack”
before an actual threat was issued. However, this would be a novel scenario and is, at this
point, largely conjecture. The likelier scenario by far is that action taken in “self-defense”
based only on concerns of the possibility of a nuclear strike would be seen as premature and
constitute an illegal preemptive strike.
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expectations. Whether such an approach is right or wrong is up for
debate, but the world will look considerably different if this
program moves it closer to a theory of contingent sovereignty.
In a contingent sovereignty world, sovereign equality and
territorial integrity would no longer be fundamental components
of the international order.148 Instead, the states of the world would
be “haunted by the continuities of a differentiated and ambiguous
sovereign status that is indexed to their imperial past.”149 This
system would result in “the sustained violation of territorial
integrity performed by hovering drones, where the terrain
underneath is subjected to an on-going de facto form of
occupation.”150 In this way, contingent sovereignty is dichotomous.
On the one hand, there are strong states who maintain true
sovereignty because they have the power to control their borders.
On the other hand, there are weak states who have only contingent
sovereignty because they can only control their territory when it
suits the strong states.151 Such a system would be antithetical to the
notion of sovereign equality among states and would greatly
undermine the strength and purpose of the UN Charter.
In fact, scholars need not even speculate on the consequences of
moving from sovereign equality to contingent sovereignty—the
consequences have been spelled out already in one of western
civilization’s oldest histories. In Thucydides’ History of the
Peloponnesian War, the Melian dialogue depicts perfectly how
diplomacy works in a contingent sovereignty world.152 According
to Thucydides’ account, the Melian people sought to stay neutral in
the Peloponnesian war and are visited by an Athenian envoy sent
to discuss their intentions.153 Upon arrival, the Athenians informed
the Melians of their disinterest in arguments invoking justice or
morality, asserting that what makes something “right” is “only in

148. See Sara Kendall, Cartographies of the Present: ‘Contingent Sovereignty’ and Territorial
Integrity, NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 84, 88 (2016).
149. Campbell A.O. Munro, Mapping the Vertical Battlespace: Toward a Legal Cartography
of Aerial Sovereignty, 2 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 233, 260 (2014).
150. Kendall, supra note 148, at 89.
151. Id. at 90–91.
152. See THUCYDIDES, THE MELIAN DIALOGUE: HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR (431 BC).
153. Id.
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question between equals in power, while the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must.”154
Since the siege of Melos depicted by Thucydides centuries ago,
history has repeatedly reaffirmed the Melian Dialogue’s starkest
lesson on power dynamics. Only since the founding of the United
Nations have powerful states been effectively constrained in the
pursuit of their self-interest by principles other than “might makes
right.”155 Abandoning now the principles of mutual security and
sovereign equality would revert the world back to its days when
self-determination belonged to the strong, while the “weak
suffer[ed] what they must.”156
In response to these projections, critics may argue that because
the United States clearly designed UAV DMDP for nuclear ICBM
defense and weak states do not have nuclear ICBMs, programs like
UAV DMDP do not create a contingent sovereignty world because
they will target only strong states, not weak states. However, even
if programs like UAV DMDP were only used against strong states
and its use against strong states was tempered by rival state power,
it would still be a program undeniably designed to accomplish
preemptive self-defense, and preemptive self-defense is
irreconcilable with the current law of international sovereignty.
Neither new treaties nor strategic targeting can rescue UAV DMDP
from its preemptive purpose and sovereignty-eroding effects.
Despite these and other concerns that UAV DMDP may raise,
the United States will still most likely implement it as planned.
First, reports already project it will be “hitting the skies in [2021]
and its laser weapon blasting [by 2022].”157 Second, the United
States has already dedicated tens of millions of dollars to the
program, awarding contracts to General Atomics Electromagnetic
Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems, and Boeing Defense
Space & Security to help develop the technology necessary for UAV

154. Id.
155. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/262 (Apr. 1, 2014). Even now, the UN does not always
succeed at deterring powerful states from ignoring the sovereignty of weaker states, such as
Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea. See Fred Dews, NATO Secretary-General: Russia’s
Annexation of Crimea is Illegal and Illegitimate, BROOKINGS (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2014/03/19/nato-secretary-generalrussias-annexation-of-crimea-is-illegal-and-illegitimate/.
156. THUCYDIDES, supra note 152.
157. Barrie, supra note 5.
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DMDP.158 Investments such as these convey a serious intent by the
United States to develop and use the technology. Third, drone
technology does not exclusively belong to the United States; in fact,
nearly one hundred other countries currently have military
drones.159 If the United States decides not to pioneer the way
forward with UAV DMDP, there is a good chance that it will be
subjected to the will of another country that does.
Furthermore, judging from the United States’ past actions in
comparable situations like Libya in 1986, the National Security
Strategy in 2002, the Iraq invasion in 2003, and the Unwilling or
Unable Doctrine in 2014, it seems that U.S. security interests rarely
lose to sovereignty status quo interests, even in the face of
widespread criticism. Most recently, the United States reaffirmed
its preference for security interests over sovereignty concerns by
assassinating Iran’s Major General Qassem Soleimani in January of
2020.160 The United States killed General Soleimani via drone strike
while the General was leaving the Baghdad airport in Iraq.161 By
way of justification, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that
Soleimani was an “imminent threat to American lives,” implying
the strike was covered by self-defense.162
By so claiming, the United States seems to argue that “imminent
threats” include the very existence of military persons who have
158. Andrew Wheeler, Inside the U.S. Missile Agency’s Quest for a UAV Laser Weapon to
Take Out ICBMs, ENGINEERING.COM (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.engineering.com/
Hardware/ArticleID/17618/Inside-the-US-Missile-Agencys-Quest-for-a-UAV-LaserWeapon-to-Take-Out-ICBMs.aspx; see also Lockheed Martin’s Missile Defense Laser Concept
Continues
Toward
Development,
LOCKHEED
MARTIN
(Oct.
30,
2018),
https://news.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases?item=128605; Arun Mathew, Boeing
Awarded Contract for Low Power Laser Demonstrator (LPLD) Phase 1 Effort, DEFPOST.COM
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2017),
https://defpost.com/boeing-awarded-contract-low-power-laserdemonstrator-lpld-phase-1-effort/; James LaPorta, General Atomics Awarded $8.8M Contract
for Low Power Laser Demonstrator, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Nov. 7, 2017, 1:58 PM),
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/11/07/General-Atomics-awarded-88Mcontract-for-low-power-laser-demonstrator/8501510080357/.
159. Ryan Pickrell, Nearly 100 Countries Have Military Drones, and It’s Changing the Way
the World Prepares for War, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:13 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/world-rethinks-war-as-nearly-100-countries-fieldmilitary-drones-2019-9?.
160. Lyse Doucet, Qasem Soleimani: US Kills Top Iranian General in Baghdad Air Strike,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463.
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harmed the United States in the past and will likely do so again.163
In Soleimani’s case, the United States believed he constituted such
an “imminent threat” that self-defense principles could justify
operating military aircraft in Iraqi sovereign airspace and
launching lethal attacks without authorization.164 The attack on
Soleimani, along with the aforementioned examples, serves as
weighty evidence that modern day self-defense calculations look
less and less like the Caroline test and more like a single-question
test of contingent sovereignty: are a powerful state’s objectives
more important than a weaker state’s sovereign rights?
The problem of the UAV DMDP is a classic problem of liberty
versus security. If the United States does not implement UAV
DMDP, it denies itself the “holy grail” of missile defense systems;
if it does, it takes a large step toward making international
sovereignty conditional upon American discretion. The former
option leaves the United States vulnerable to a nuclear catastrophe;
the latter undermines one of the foundational doctrines of the
modern international regime. In all likelihood, the United States
will implement UAV DMDP and lead the world on a steady march
toward contingent sovereignty.

163. An instance such as this potentially could be justified by a theory of interceptive
self-defense, but decidedly not by traditional self-defense analysis according to the Caroline
test. For a discussion on interceptive self-defense, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENCE (6th ed. 2017).
164. Doucet, supra note 160.
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